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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
STANLEY M. KURZET, an 
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET 
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees 
for The Kurzet Family Trust; 
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and 
JOHN DOES I through X, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. ("Bailey-Allen") 
responds to this appeal by Appellants (collectively referred to as 
"Kurzet") from a decision by the Third Judicial District Court of 
Summit County, State of Utah. The Third Judicial District Court 
(the "trial court") ruled in favor of Bailey-Allen on the issue of 
partial entitlement to damages and the issues of prejudgment and 
post-judgment interest. The trial court ruled in favor of Kurzet 
on the issues of Bailey-Allen7s breach of the contract and damage 
Case No. 930178-CA 
Priority 15 
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offsets. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes and rules are determinative in 
this action: 
Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3) (1993) , Contractors' Bonds, Private 
Contracts: 
Failure of owner to obtain payment bond — 
Liability. 
(3) In an action for failure to obtain a 
bond, the court may award reasonable 
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 
These fees shall be taxed as costs in the 
action. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1993), Mechanics' Liens: 
Attorneys' fees• 
In any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party shall 
be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' 
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be 
taxed as costs in the action. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(e): 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the 
judgment. The clerk must include in any 
judgment signed by him any interest on the 
verdict or decision from the time it was 
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been 
taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within 
two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in 
the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a 
blank left in the judgment for that purpose, 
and make a similar notation thereof in the 
bjn\4188 2 
register of actions and in the judgment 
docket. 
Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504(1): 
Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for 
the party or parties obtaining the ruling 
shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter 
time as the court may direct, file with the 
court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in 
conformity with the ruling. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Bailey-Allen brought this action against Kurzet seeking 
to recover payment under contract for services it rendered as the 
general contractor for Kurzet's home. 
Kurzet appeals from the judgment of the trial court, 
seeking to overrule the trial court's award of damages to Bailey-
Allen. 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Bailey-Allen filed this action on or about December 5, 
1990, and Kurzet filed an Answer and Counterclaim on January 30, 
1991. After three days of trial, the trial court ruled that 
Bailey-Allen was entitled to compensation of $10,000 for the 
services it rendered as general contractor, along with $5,500, 
representing the value of a benefit to Kurzet in the savings on 
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lumber costs. However, the court offset these awards with some 
minor damage awards to Kurzet, 
Kurzet filed this appeal to the trial court's decision on 
February 12, 1993. 
III. STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL RELEVANT FACTS 
In addition to those facts set forth in Kurzet's brief, 
Bailey-Allen submits the following additional relevant facts: 
1. Kurzet sought to build a 14,207 square foot home in 
Park City, Utah (R. at 494) , with an estimated construction cost of 
$1,000,000 (R. at 302, p. 70). Kurzet was financing the 
construction on his own, without the necessity of any construction 
loan or long-term financing. (R. at 302, p. 93.) 
2. Kurzet sought out the services of Bailey-Allen to 
act as general contractor of construction because Kurzet liked the 
construction and progress of another home in the area built by 
Bailey-Allen. (R. 498.) 
3. After initial negotiations with Bailey-Allen, Kurzet 
decided to use Bailey-Allen as the general contractor of the home. 
(R. at 302, p. 23.) The agreed price for Bailey-Alleys services 
as general contractor was the sum of $100,000. (R. at 009, the 
Agreement.) 
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4. The written construction contract governing the 
transaction was drafted by Kurzet without the benefit or assistance 
of a lawyer. (R. at 302, pp. 19-20.) 
5. The construction contract contained no provisions 
relating to remedies in case of default by either party, nor any 
provisions requiring any certain number of hours on the project by 
Bailey-Allen. (R. at 302, pp. 20-21.) 
6. Kurzet was generally happy with the progress of 
construction of the home during the time Bailey-Allen was on the 
job. (R. at 608-11.) At the time of Bailey-Allen's termination as 
general contractor, the home was framed and the roof was partially 
completed. (R. at 677.) 
7. The major reason for terminating Bailey-Allen's 
services as general contractor was the failure of Bailey-Allen to 
provide a certificate of insurance within the time required by 
Kurzet. (R. at 217.) Bailey-Allen did supply a certificate of 
insurance within hours of their termination, but Kurzet did not 
choose to accept the same. (R. at 606-07.) 
8. After three months of work under the contract by 
Bailey-Allen, the Kurzet home had been framed, the roof was 
partially finished (R. at 677) , and the work under the contract was 
ten percent (10%) complete (R. at 215). 
bjn\4188 5 
9. At trial, Kurzet offered no evidence of any damages 
suffered because of the failure to supply proof of insurance. (R. 
at 535, pp. 16-17.) Likewise, Kurzet offered no evidence of any 
general damages whatsoever, offering only for some minor offsets 
claimed for faulty construction. The trial court accepted such 
offsets and deducted the same from amounts otherwise owed to 
Bailey-Allen. (R. at 218-19.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Contrary to Kurzet's argument that the trial court 
confused and inappropriately mixed "contract" and "unjust 
enrichment" remedies, the trial court was not confused and did not 
misapply the law or err in its damage awards. 
The contract between Kurzet and Bailey-Allen, which was 
drafted by Kurzet, was ambiguous and incomplete, lacking any 
provisions for default or forfeiture. In spite of this, the trial 
court found that there was an enforceable contract, but that it 
needed to be interpreted and added upon. Based on the contract, 
the trial court merely awarded to Bailey-Allen the compensation 
earned by Bailey-Allen as general contractor for the three-month 
period prior to the time the contract was terminated. 
In addition, the trial court used the theory of unjust 
enrichment to award Bailey-Allen $5,500, which sum was the value of 
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a benefit conferred upon Kurzet by Bailey-Allen regarding a savings 
on the cost of lumber. 
Kurzet argues that because Bailey-Allen breached the 
contract, Bailey-Allen is prevented from being paid for its pre-
breach services. However, Kurzet offered no evidence of general 
damages arising from the breach (other than a few minor offsets for 
faulty construction, which were accepted by the trial court). 
Kurzet argues that the trial court erred in refusing to 
award him attorney's fees in connection with the dismissal of 
Bailey-Allen's claims regarding a mechanic's lien and failure to 
post a contractor's bond. Under Utah law, a court has great 
discretion in awarding attorney's fees. Further, Kurzet's claim 
for attorney's fees combined three causes of action, only two of 
which were ultimately dismissed. Because Kurzet made no attempt to 
distinguish between the fees for each separate cause of action, the 
trial could was unable to separate the fees and, after deferring 
the decision, used its discretion in refusing the award. 
Kurzet argues that the trial court erred in awarding 
Bailey-Allen prejudgment interest. In order to receive the benefit 
of its contractual rights to payment, Bailey-Allen deserves an 
award of prejudgment interest, and the trial court properly awarded 
such interest. The amount owing to Bailey-Allen was liquidated at 
the time of termination of the contract. 
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Kurzet argues that the trial court erred in awarding 
Bailey-Allen post-judgment interest beginning two and one-half 
months after the trial court verbally rendered its decision, but 
prior to actually signing the judgment. However, the trial court 
based its decision on the fact that Kurzet, under order of the 
court to do so, did not prepare the findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and judgments in a timely fashion. In the interests of 
justice, and based on the circumstances of the case, the trial 
court awarded post-judgment interest to Bailey-Allen from the time 
the trial court verbally "rendered" the judgment. 
The trial court properly rendered its judgment in the 
case, and Bailey-Allen respectfully requests this Court to uphold 
the trial court's decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE FACTS, THE 
PARTIES' INTENT, AND THE LAW. 
A. Background to the Trial Court's Decision. 
Kurzet raises, as its principal issue on appeal, that the 
trial court erred in granting a judgment in favor of Bailey-Allen 
(allegedly on an unjust enrichment theory) when there was a written 
contract governing the transaction between the parties. Kurzet 
expresses concern that the trial court has somehow inappropriately 
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mixed "contract" and "unjust enrichment" remedies. Kurzet further 
claims that the trial court was confused, if not inconsistent, when 
applying the facts to the law. Kurzet asserts that it is 
impossible to find that Bailey-Allen breached the construction 
contract and likewise be entitled to a judgment against Kurzet. 
The trial court was not confused, nor did it misapply the 
law. To understand the ruling, it is essential to understand how 
the trial court made its decision. 
After three days of trial, the trial court ruled that 
Kurzet owed Bailey-Allen the net sum of $11,141 for services 
rendered in connection with the construction of Kurzet7s Park City 
residence. (R. at 805.) Such amount was calculated as follows: 
$10,000 (amounts earned under the construction 
contract) 
+ 5,500 (amounts which Bailey-Allen saved Kurzet in 
payment for lumber ordered by a prior 
contractor) 
$15,500 (total amount owed by Kurzet) 
4,359 (offsets awarded by the trial court for 
faulty construction) 
$11,141 The amount owed to Bailey-Allen from Kurzet, 
plus prejudgment interest at 10% per annum 
from 11-1-90 to 4-17-92 and post-judgment 
interest at 12% per annum from and after 4-17-
92. 
(R. at 218-19.) 
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The award for $10,000 was clearly awarded pursuant to the 
construction contract. The trial court did not make such award 
under an "unjust enrichment" theory. (R. at 218.) 
The award for $5,500 for the savings on the cost of 
lumber was rendered under an "unjust enrichment" theory. The trial 
court found that Bailey-Allen's work and negotiations with regard 
to the lumber constituted a benefit to Kurzet. (R. at 216 and 748-
749.) Such savings and the resulting benefit to Kurzet were not 
covered in the contract between Kurzet and Bailey-Allen. (R. at 9-
13.) The contract, which was drafted by Kurzet, stated that the 
"Contractor will obtain competitive bids for services and materials 
. . . ." (R. at 10.) The lumber was already at the building site 
from a previous contractor, but Kurzet had not yet paid for it. 
(R. at 748-49.) Bailey-Allen took the time to count every piece of 
lumber and calculate its value, then recommended that Kurzet pay 
only $22,500 for the lumber, rather than the previously-billed 
price of $28,000. (Id.) Kurzet took Bailey-Allen's recommendation 
and was able to save the sum of $5,500. Counting and calculating 
lumber already delivered was not part of obtaining "competitive 
bids" as stated in the contract. 
It does not matter whether the award of $5,500 was made 
pursuant to the contract, or whether the trial court found that 
such services were outside the contract and awarded under a theory 
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of "unjust enrichment." Either theory would be supported by the 
facts presented at trial. Certainly, Kurzet enjoyed the benefit of 
a $5,500 savings which resulted from actions of Bailey-Allen. 
Consequently, the trial court was not confusing theories 
of contract and unjust enrichment in its award to Bailey-Allen. It 
awarded $10,000 to Bailey-Allen under the contract on the basis of 
the fair amount of services that Bailey-Allen rendered to Kurzet, 
and $5,500 under the theory of unjust enrichment for benefit which 
Kurzet received by the savings in lumber costs. 
B. Kurzet's Construction Contract Did Not Prohibit Payment 
to Bailey-Allen for Services Rendered Prior to 
Termination of the Contract. 
The trial court was not confused as to remedies, as is 
suggested by Kurzet. The confusion, if any, arose in the trial 
court having to interpret the parties' intent from an ambiguous and 
incomplete contract drafted by Kurzet. (R. at 217.) The contract 
contained no provision outlining remedies in case of default by 
either party. (R. at 009, the Agreement.) As a result, following 
the evidence presented at trial, the trial court was faced with the 
task of deciding what the parties had really intended in such a 
situation. (R. at 217.) As a result, this is a case of contract 
interpretation (a question of fact), not a matter of confusion as 
to remedies. 
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When "the document appears to incompletely express the 
parties' agreement or if it is ambiguous in expressing that 
agreement," the court may resort to the use of extrinsic evidence. 
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist. 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 
1989). see also Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1062 
(Utah 1981) ("when an ambiguity exists which cannot be reconciled 
by an objective and reasonable interpretation of the contract as a 
whole that resort may be had to the use of extrinsic evidence.") 
Kurzet confuses the factual findings of the trial court 
with alleged inappropriate legal conclusions. To interpret an 
ambiguous and incomplete contract to the parties' presumed 
intentions under all of the evidence submitted to the trial court 
in three days of trial is clearly a factual interpretation, not a 
legal conclusion of law. "The findings and conclusions of the 
District Court must be affirmed unless there is no reasonable basis 
in the evidence to support them." Nielsen v. Chin-Hsien Wang, 613 
P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 1980). In the instant case, the result of the 
trial court was a decision reached after listening to days of trial 
about the amount of time worked, the hours spent, the services 
rendered, the results obtained, and the percentage of completion of 
the construction project. To second guess the trial court at this 
point would be to overrule its factual determinations to the 
windfall of Kurzet. 
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Kurzet argues that the trial court's ruling that Bailey-
Allen breached the construction contract somehow prevented Bailey-
Allen from being paid for pre-breach services, even though Kurzet 
offered no evidence of general damages arising from the breach. 
Had Kurzet wanted a contract which would have required Bailey-Allen 
to forfeit previously-earned contractor fees in case of a default 
during construction, he could have incorporated such a provision 
into the construction contract. He did not do so. The contract 
drafted by Kurzet was silent as to remedies and damages in case of 
default by either party. (R. at 302, pp. 19-20.) The trial court 
merely found that following a mid-construction breach by Bailey-
Allen, Kurzet was required to pay previously-earned fees pursuant 
to the contract. (R. at 803-804.) 
The difficulty in assessing damages was not the trial 
court's misunderstanding of the law, as suggested by Kurzet, but 
arose in the interpretation of Kurzet's home-spun construction 
contract which contained no provisions to guide the parties in case 
of default. It was the contract's ambiguity and incompleteness 
that troubled the trial court, not a confusion of the law. 
The trial court found that Kurzet had been the general 
contractor on the job for a period of three months, during which 
time the construction had achieved ten percent (10%) of the 
expected total work under the contract. (R. at 216.) When Bailey-
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Allen was terminated, the home had reached a stage of being framed 
and partially roofed-in. (R. at 677.) 
It is a "well-established rule" in Utah "that any 
uncertainty with respect to construction of a contract should be 
resolved against the party who had drawn the agreement." Sears v. 
Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982). Further, when there is 
an ambiguity in a contract that could have been readily defined, 
the ambiguous language should be construed against the party who 
drafted the provision. Metro. Prop. & Liability v. Finlayson, 751 
P.2d 254, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Having no contractual default 
provision to guide its decision, the trial court in the instant 
case considered several alternatives to determine what, if any, 
compensation Bailey-Allen was entitled to receive for the services 
it rendered in the partial construction of Kurzet's residence. 
Even a valid termination of the construction contract by Kurzet, 
absent claimed damages, cannot override the fact that compensation 
had already been earned under the contract. 
The trial court found, in interpreting the contract and 
the parties' presumed intent, that the contract allowed Bailey-
Allen some pre-termination compensation for its services rendered 
as general contractor. (R. at 218.) Although Kurzet argues that 
the trial court misapplied an "unjust enrichment" remedy in a 
contract case, the trial court did not do so. It merely selected 
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a measure of damages missing from the contract after the trial 
court heard all of the evidence of the parties. 
Since the construction contract drafted by Kurzet did not 
contain a provision wherein Bailey-Allen would forfeit all of the 
previously-earned contractor fee if terminated prior to the 
finishing of the Kurzet resident, the trial court was required to 
interpret Kurzet7s incomplete contract based upon the facts of the 
case and to follow the parties presumed intention under the 
ambiguous terms of the contract. 
Even if the award had been made on an unjust enrichment 
theory, the special circumstances of this case allow such a remedy 
where the written contract failed to provide a remedy in case of 
default. MA plaintiff is entitled to recover based on the unjust 
enrichment of a defendant when the plaintiff has no alternative 
right on an enforceable contract.11 Backus v. Apishapa Land and 
Cattle Co. , 615 P.2d 42, 44 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980). In the instant 
case, because of the incompleteness and ambiguity of the contract, 
Bailey-Allen had no right under the contract to damages and the 
trial court was justified in awarding a percentage of the 
construction completed. To recover under unjust enrichment, a 
plaintiff must have conferred a benefit on the defendant "which the 
defendant accepted or retained, making it inequitable for him to 
retain the benefit without payment." Id. ; see also Davies v. 
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Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("If defendant . . . 
requested services and received a benefit which would be unjustly 
retained, he is liable under quantum meruit [unjust enrichment].") 
Even though Kurzet denies that he received any benefit 
from Bailey-Allen and claims that Bailey-Allen did not perform 
satisfactorily as a general contractor (R. at 513-16), excerpts 
from Kurzet's construction log book illustrate that he was 
generally pleased with the progress of construction throughout the 
three-month period that Bailey-Allen supervised the work on the 
Kurzet home. Some of the comments Kurzet wrote in his log book 
were: "good progress on framing" on August 2, 1990 (R. at 608); 
"things continue to go well" on August 3, 1990 (R. at 609); and, 
"had a warm feeling that things are going okay" on September 26, 
1990 (just a few days before Kurzet terminated Bailey-Allen) (R. at 
611) . In addition, Kurzet agreed with Bailey-Allen's 
recommendation to pay $5,500 less on the lumber (R. at 123-24), and 
he acknowledged in his testimony at trial that Bailey-Allen did 
provide him with good subcontractors and other services (R. at 659-
61) . 
Bailey-Allen worked for three months on the Kurzet 
residence, but was not paid anything for its general contractor 
services. (R. at 50-51 and 595.) Because of the contract with 
Kurzet, Bailey-Allen passed up bidding on other jobs for the winter 
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of 1990-91. (R. at 337.) After being terminated by Kurzet, 
Bailey-Allen was unable to obtain any substantial work throughout 
the winter of 1990-91 because of the state of the economy and only 
brought in $13,000 during that time. (R. at 359-364.) Under these 
circumstances, it would be unjust for Kurzet to refuse to pay 
Bailey-Allen for the benefits he received from its services as 
general contractor for three months. The trial court correctly 
concluded that Kurzet was benefited by Bailey-Allen's pre-
termination services. (R. at 216.) 
The trial court's award to Bailey-Allen was based on an 
interpretation of the construction contract, not an application of 
an unjust enrichment remedy. However, the award could be supported 
under an unjust enrichment theory because of the special 
circumstances of this case, where the written agreement contained 
no provisions relating to the measure of damages. 
C. The Trial Court was Correct in its Method of Measuring 
Bailey-Allen's Award of Damages Under the Contract. 
In determining the amount owed to Bailey-Allen at the 
time of the termination of the contract, the trial court considered 
several alternatives to fill in the void created by the incomplete 
contract. The trial court was urged to consider that the length of 
construction was one-fourth done and to give Bailey-Allen one-
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fourth of the $100,000 fee, but the court did not accept such 
argument. (R. at 802-803.) 
The trial court also considered other alternatives, such 
as the percentage of money spent on the construction project or the 
number of hours worked by Bailey-Allen. (R. at 802.) However, the 
trial court decided against such alternatives. (Id.) 
The alternative adopted by the trial court was to award 
Bailey-Allen compensation in relation to the percentage of the 
amount of work completed on the contract during the time Bailey-
Allen was on the job. (R. at 216.) 
Because Kurzet submitted no claim for damages (other than 
the minor offsets granted by the trial court), the trial court was 
correct in not assessing additional damages against Bailey-Allen 
and in awarding compensation earned prior to termination of the 
contract. Such a method of calculating earned compensation does 
not inappropriately mix remedies of contract and unjust enrichment. 
As to the award of the savings of the lumber under the 
theory of unjust enrichment, the trial court gave Bailey-Allen the 
value of the benefit to Kurzet. This follows the ruling by the 
Utah Court of Appeals in Davies that damages under unjust 
enrichment (also referred to as quasi-contract) are to measured by 
"the value of the benefit conferred on the defendant (the 
defendant's gain) and not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff, 
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or necessarily the reasonable value of plaintiff's services.11 
Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Therefore, the trial court was correct in measuring 
Bailey-Allen's damage award under the contract as the value of 
Bailey-Allen's services as general contractor in percentage to the 
work completed on Kurzet's residence. Furthermore, the trial court 
correctly awarded the amount of the lumber savings by using the 
value of the benefit conferred upon Kurzet. 
D. A Breach of Contract by Bailey-Allen Does Not Require 
That Previously-Earned Compensation Be Forfeited. 
Kurzet further argues that it is inconsistent for the 
trial court to find that Bailey-Allen breached the construction 
contract and also grant a judgment in favor of Bailey-Allen. Such 
logic does not make sense. A mid-construction breach by Bailey-
Allen does not require it to forfeit previously-earned compensation 
for its services under the contract. 
Consider the following hypothetical situation. A general 
contractor has completed 99% of the construction of a home over a 
one-year construction period. Just prior to completion of 
construction, the contractor's liability insurance lapses and the 
homeowner terminates the general contractor because of such fact. 
The final one percent of construction is completed by another 
contractor for one percent of the total contractor's fee. The 
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homeowner then argues that the first contractor is entitled to no 
compensation for the entire year's work, even though the owner 
suffered no monetary damages. Such a result would be tremendously 
unfair. In the absence of other damages to the owner, or a 
specific contract term to the contrary, the logical result would be 
to give the contractor the benefit of the contract price, less the 
uncompleted work. 
Similarly, in the instant case, the trial court applied 
the same rationale to a situation where the work was ten percent 
(10%) completed. The trial court, in the absence of missing 
contractual direction (R. at 217), awarded the contractor the value 
of its services under the applied percentage of completion (R. at 
218) . To apply such a measure of contract damages is not an 
inappropriate application of unjust enrichment theory to the case. 
It should be noted that Bailey-Allen argued at trial that 
the home was 25% completed at the time of termination. (R. at 
747.) It was Kurzet's witness who came up with the 10% figure 
accepted by the trial court. (R. at 215.) As a result, the trial 
court granted judgment in the lowest amount possible under the 
evidence submitted. 
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E. As General Contractor. Bailey-Allen was Liable for 
Actions of the Subcontractors and Should Likewise Be 
Responsible for the Progress of the Subcontractors. 
At the trial, Kurzet argued that, as general contractor, 
Bailey-Allen should be liable for any faulty construction or delays 
caused by subcontractors or suppliers. (R. at 647-59,) The trial 
court ruled, in essence, that it would be inconsistent to make 
Bailey-Allen responsible for any delays or mistakes of 
subcontractors without also giving Bailey-Allen the reciprocal 
benefit (as general contractor) of good work done by subcontractors 
and suppliers. Indeed, Kurzet cannot have it both ways. 
Bailey-Allen is not seeking, nor receiving a windfall. 
It merely seeks the benefit of its contractual rights — nothing 
more and nothing less. The evidence was plentiful that Bailey-
Allen performed substantial contractor services. While Bailey-
Allen was the general contractor, the Kurzet residence went from 
basically a foundation to three framed floors of over 14,000 square 
feet, with a partially-finished roof. (R. at 677.) Bailey-Allen 
ordered supplies (R. 659-60), obtained bids, and worked with the 
city to arrange numerous inspections, along with other services as 
general contractor. (R. at 752-53.) Also, Bailey-Allen provided 
Kurzet with good subcontractors (R. at 659-61), and supervised the 
work of the subcontractors (R. at 660). Moreover, Kurzet was 
generally pleased with Bailey-Allen's progress throughout the three 
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months Bailey-Allen worked as the general contractor, as evidenced 
by Kurzet's written comments throughout his log book. An entry 
written by Kurzet only a few days before Bailey-Allen's termination 
on October 2, 1990, stated that Kurzet "had a warm feeling that 
things are going okay" (September 26, 1990). (R. at 611). 
Kurzet wants to enjoy the contractual benefits conveyed 
by Bailey-Allen without paying for those benefits. Indeed, an 
award of $11,141 for three months' work as general contractor on a 
million dollar home hardly seems an abuse of discretion for the 
services rendered by Bailey-Allen. 
F. The Time Spent on the Job Site bv Bailey-Allen is 
Irrelevant in a Fixed-Fee Contract. 
Kurzet argues that Bailey-Allen spent only 60.5 hours of 
time on site during the three-month period. (Brief of Appellant, 
p. 21.) Such an assertion is clearly wrong. It should be noted 
that the contract called for two types of work and compensation. 
First, general contracting services were to be performed for a fee 
of $100,000. (R. at 214-15.) Second, any actual work performed by 
the general contractor (i.e. pouring concrete, framing, etc.) was 
to be billed on an hourly basis. (R. at 215.) The 60.5 hours 
referred to by Kurzet are the amount of hours of actual labor 
performed by Bailey-Allen (and paid for by Kurzet), not the hours 
for the general contractor services. (R. at 357.) 
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Bailey-Allen did not need to keep tract of every hour 
spent on general contracting services because the amount of time 
spent was immaterial to the agreed compensation. Indeed, the 
construction contract did not require a certain number of hours on 
the project by the general contractor, nor its on-site presence at 
any particular hour of the day. (R. at 009, the Agreement.) As 
long as the work was progressing under Bailey-Allen's direction, 
Bailey-Allen was fulfilling the terms of the contract. 
The result reached by the trial court is consistent with 
the facts and the law. To rule otherwise would give Kurzet a 
windfall not intended by the parties. Had Kurzet intended a breach 
of the contract by Bailey-Allen to create a forfeiture of moneys 
previously earned, he could have written that harsh remedy into the 
contract. He did not do so and the courts should not impose such 
a strict result upon the Bailey-Allen. 
II. THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO BE AWARDED KURZET IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE DISMISSED CAUSES OF ACTION IS 
DISCRETIONARY AND SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED BY THIS COURT. 
Kurzet next argues that the trial court erred in failing 
to award, in its discretion, attorney's fees in connection with 
dismissal of Bailey-Allen's mechanic's lien claim and the claim 
based upon Kurzet's failure to post a contractor's bond. 
Pursuant to pretrial motions, on August 26, 1991, the 
trial court dismissed three of Bailey-Allen's causes of action: 
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(i) a mechanic's lien claim; (ii) a claim of liability based upon 
Kurzet's failure to post a contractors bond; and (iii) the claim 
for relief under a theory of unjust enrichment. (R. at 299.) The 
trial court reserved its ruling on Kurzet's request for attorney's 
fees. (R. at 128.) (The unjust enrichment claim was later 
reinstated by the trial court, sua sponte, prior to trial. (R. at 
158.)) 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that •• [i]t is this 
Court's policy to accord great deference to the discretionary 
conclusions of the trial court regarding attorney fees." Paul 
Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n. . 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 
1982) . "Attorney's fees cannot be allowed unless there is evidence 
to support them." Id. After listening to all of the evidence 
presented at trial, the trial court exercised its discretionary 
powers and did not award attorney's fees to Kurzet. 
Statutes relating to the mechanic's lien claim and the 
contractor's bond claim give the trial court discretion in awarding 
of fees to the successful party. There is no statutory authority 
for the awarding of attorney's fees in dismissal of an unjust 
enrichment claim. 
The applicable statute relating to the awarding of 
attorneys' fees in a mechanic's lien case is Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-
18 (1993), which states in pertinent part: 
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In any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party shall 
be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' 
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be 
taxed as costs in the action. 
The applicable statute relating to the awarding of fees 
in a contractor bond case is Utah Code Ann, § 14-2-2(3) (1993) , 
which is as follows: 
(3) In an action for failure to obtain a 
bond, the court may award reasonable 
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 
These fees shall be taxed as costs in the 
action. (emphasis added) 
This statute specifically allows a trial court to use its 
discretion based upon the facts of a case. 
Kurzet requested the sum of $2,137.50 in attorney's fees 
in connection with its motion to dismiss. (R. at 111-12.) In its 
application for attorney's fees, Kurzet made no attempt to 
distinguish its services rendered on the unjust enrichment claim 
from the other two causes of action. There was no way the trial 
court could arbitrarily distinguish such services. The trial court 
deferred the decision on fees until later. (R. at 128.) 
In Paul Mueller Company, the Utah Supreme Court used the 
case of Utah Farm Production Credit Association v. Cox as an 
example where the court properly refused to award attorney's fees 
because the "prevailing plaintiff failed to provide enough proof to 
enable the court to distinguish the portion of plaintiff's fees 
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spent in prosecuting the complaint from the portion spent in 
defending the counterclaim." 657 P.2d 1279, 1288 (Utah 1982). 
Likewise, Kurzet never attempted to segregate his fees on 
the various causes of action, but renewed his motion for fees at 
the conclusion of trial. (R. at 194.) After having heard all the 
evidence, the trial court in its allowed discretion, failed to 
grant attorney's fees to Kurzet in connection with the prior 
motions to dismiss. (R. at 300, p. 22.) 
It should also be noted that the trial court did not 
award Bailey-Allen attorney's fees on its Motion to Compel 
Findings, Conclusion and Judgment, which motion was granted by the 
trial court on April 17, 1992. 
The trial court has discretion in awarding attorneys' 
fees and did not err in refusing to award Kurzet (or Bailey-Allen) 
attorney's fees. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED BAILEY-ALLEN PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST. 
Kurzet argues that even if he owes money on the 
construction contract, he should not have to pay prejudgment 
interest thereon at the statutory rate. Such argument asserts that 
the debt was non-liquidated until the time of trial and under Utah 
case law, is exempt from prejudgment interest. Kurzet further 
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argues that prejudgment interest is inapplicable to cases of 
"unjust enrichment." 
Kurzet's brief cites Shoreline Development, Inc. v. Utah 
County as support for his contention that Bailey-Allen is not 
entitled to a prejudgment interest award. Even if applicable, 
Shoreline does not prevent an award of interest in the instant 
case. First, Shoreline involved a case in equity which is not 
applicable to the instant case of contract. Shoreline Development, 
Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Second, 
Shoreline involved a jury decision awarding the amount of damages, 
rather than a judge, and the Utah Court of Appeals felt that "there 
is a risk of double recovery if prejudgment interest [is] added to 
a jury's equity award by the trial court which does not know 
whether the jury's award covers interest." Id. at 211. Third, 
Shoreline specifically provides for an award of interest in unjust 
enrichment cases tried directly to the court. It only prohibits 
prejudgment interest in unjust enrichment cases tried to a jury. 
Id. at 212. 
In the instant case, there was no jury involved in 
deciding Bailey-Allen's award of damages. The trial judge decided 
that prejudgment interest was appropriate under the circumstances 
and there was no danger of "double recovery" due to a prior jury 
award. 
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The Supreme Court of Utah has given the following 
guidelines for awarding prejudgment interest: 
[W]here the damage is complete and the amount 
of the loss is fixed as of a particular timef 
and that loss can be measured by facts and 
figures, interest should be allowed from that 
time and not from the date of judgment. On 
the other hand, where damages are incomplete 
or cannot be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy, such as in case of personal injury, 
wrongful death, defamation of character, false 
imprisonment, etc., the amount of the damage 
must be ascertained and assessed by the trier 
of the fact at the trial, and in such cases 
prejudgment interest is not allowed. 
Biork v. April Industries. Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah 1977). 
While it is certainly true that neither party knew the 
amount Kurzet would be required to pay until the time of trial, 
such situation exists in any trial. In the instant case, the 
percentage of completion of the construction was easily determined 
by Kurzet had he wanted to do so. Indeed, it was Kurzet's own 
witness who gave the trial court the ten percent (10%) completion 
figure. 
Finally, this is not a case of equity (i.e., personal 
injury, defamation, etc.) where prejudgment interest is 
inappropriate. 
A debt was owed by Kurzet to Bailey-Allen. In order to 
receive the benefit of its contractual rights to payment, Bailey-
Allen deserves an award of prejudgment interest. To rule otherwise 
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would only reward Kurzet from failing to pay its bills at the 
expense of Bailey-Allen. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED BAILEY-ALLEN POST-JUDGMENT 
INTEREST FROM AND AFTER A PERIOD COMMENCING FOUR MONTHS AFTER 
THE TRIAL COURTS VERBAL DECISION. 
The trial court rendered its decision from the bench at 
the conclusion of the last day of trial (January 30, 1992) . At 
such time, the trial court ordered Kurzet to prepare the 
appropriate pleadings. (R. at 806.) 
Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration 
requires such pleadings to be submitted within fifteen (15) days of 
the date of the order. Rule 4-504 states in pertinent part: 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for 
the party or parties obtaining the ruling 
shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter 
time as the court may direct, file with the 
court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in 
conformity with the ruling. 
After the time allowed by the rule had passed, and after 
the passage of several more weeks, counsel for Bailey-Allen filed 
a Motion to Compel Filing of Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, 
asking the trial court to compel Kurzet to prepare the required 
pleadings. The motion was granted. When Kurzet finally filed its 
proposed pleadings, Bailey-Allen filed objections thereto. The 
matter was set for hearing on April 17, 1993. Because Kurzet's 
failure in submitting timely pleadings caused a delay in the actual 
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signing of the judgment, the trial court ordered that statutory 
interest (12%) should commence at such time, rather than the 
previously accruing statutory interest at the legal rate (10%). 
(R. at 300, Reporter's Transcript of Hearing on Defendant's 
Proposed Findings and Judgment, at pp.4 and 22). 
The applicable statute relating to interest on judgements 
is Rule 54(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states in 
pertinent part: 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the 
judgment. The clerk must include in any 
judgment signed by him any interest on the 
verdict or decision from the time it was 
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been 
taxed or ascertained. (Emphasis added) 
The judgment in this case was verbally "rendered" by the 
trial court on January 30, 1991. Applying the time period and 
effect of both Rule 4-504(1) of the Code of Judicial Administration 
and Rule 54(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, post-judgment 
interest would generally commence approximately fifteen (15) days 
after a verbal ruling when the required pleadings were to have been 
submitted to the trial court for signature. The intent of these 
rules is to allow a judgment creditor to be compensated for his 
unpaid debt at the rate applicable to judgments. 
In the instant case, the formal judgment was not signed 
until October 6, 1991 — nearly eight and a half (8 1/2) months 
after the trial. (R. at 222.) Inasmuch as the delay through April 
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17, 1991 was entirely caused by Kurzet's failure to file the 
required pleadings, it is appropriate that he should not benefit 
from a lower interest rate until the actual judgment was signed by 
the trial judge. Under the circumstances of this case, to hold 
that the January 30, 1992, verbal judgment was not "rendered" until 
"entered" October 10, 1992 would only reward Kurzet for the delays 
for which he was directly responsible. 
Parenthetically, this issue raised by Kurzet involves 
approximately $100 in interest (the difference in 10% interest and 
12% interest on the judgment for less than six months). In light 
of the fact that Kurzet has owed Bailey-Allen the judgment amount 
since October, 1990, such amount is not unfair under the 
circumstances and follows the implied intent of above-quoted Rules. 
On the basis of fairness and the circumstances of the 
case, the trial court's ruling that Bailey-Allen is entitled to 
post-judgment interest of twelve percent (12%) running from April 
17, 1992, should be upheld. The judgment was "rendered" by such 
date. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was not in error or confused about the 
remedies in this case. In interpreting an ambiguous and incomplete 
contract drafted by Kurzet, the trial court merely awarded 
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compensation earned by Bailey-Allen prior to the time the contract 
was terminated. The trial court also correctly awarded to Bailey-
Allen the value of the benefit conferred upon Kurzet by the savings 
in lumber. 
The trial court did not error in the exercise of its 
discretion in failing to award Kurzet attorney's fees in connection 
with motions to dismiss Bailey-Allen's claims. 
Furthermore, the interest awarded by the trial court on 
the judgment against Kurzet was properly assessed, both before and 
after judgment. 
Appellee Bailey-Allen respectfully requests this Court to 
uphold the trial court's judgment. 
DATED this ,3o day of July, 1993. 
ALLOTRELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
Bridge J. Nelson 
Attorneys for Appellee Bailey-Allen 
Company, Inc. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC., ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff, ) AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. ) 
STANLEY M. KURZET, an ) 
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET ) 
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees ) 
for THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; ) 
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and ) Civil No. 10870 
John Does 1 through 10, ) 
Defendants. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
This action, having been tried to the Court, and the 
Court, having considered the evidence and the arguments of coun-
sel, and good cause appearing therefor, hereby makes the follow-
ing findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court finds that the parties intended to and 
did enter into a written contract wherein plaintiff agreed to act 
I<'iLED 
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as the general contractor and to oversee the construction of 
defendants1 residence in Park City, Utah. 
2. The Court finds that the contract between the par-
ties provided that plaintiff would complete construction on 
defendants' residence within one year and, in return, defendant 
would pay plaintiff $100,000 consideration for plaintifffs ser-
vices in directing and supervising the construction, and $22.00 
per hour for plaintifffs own hands-on labor. 
3. The Court finds that plaintiff was aware that 
defendants had experienced problems with prior general contrac-
tors and had terminated two general contractors for unsatisfac-
tory performance. Plaintiff was also aware that Mr. Kurzet was a 
meticulous and demanding individual and would require exacting 
performance of the contract. 
4. The Court finds the parties intended and the con-
tract provided for plaintiff, within 10 days after entering into 
the contract, to provide defendants with evidence of adequate 
liability insurance covering its work pursuant to the contract. 
5. The Court finds that plaintiff represented to 
defendants that plaintiff had $1 million in liability insurance 
coverage in force at the time the parties entered into the con-
tract on July 3, 1990, that defendants wanted $4-5 million in 
coverage, and that plaintiff later discovered its policy was only 
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for $300,000 coverage and that it had been cancelled on October 
24, 1989. 
6. The Court finds that, in a memorandum of July 20, 
1990 from defendants to plaintiff, which was delivered to Michael 
Kent, defendants notified plaintiff that plaintiff had not yet 
provided the necessary certificate evidencing insurance coverage 
and that defendants required such evidence under the terms of the 
contract. 
7. The court find that defendants terminated plain-
tiff's services on October 2, 1990. 
8. The Court finds, that about 10% of the construc-
tion project was completed while plaintiff was general contractor 
and, based on that percentage, defendants received a benefit from 
plaintiff's pre-termination services in the amount of $10,000 
regardless of whether plaintiff performed its duties under the 
contract. 
9. The Court finds that defendants realized a benefit 
of $5,500 which represents the amount saved by defendants through 
plaintiff's services involving negotiations for the purchase of 
lumber. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes that the subject contract was 
ambiguous and incomplete as drafted and that the Court has a 
responsibility to add to it and to look upon it as an oral con-
tract between the parties* 
2. The Court concludes that the contract can be 
interpreted as written. 
3. The Court concludes that given the amount of the 
subject contract and the cost of the construction, plaintiff had 
a duty to inquire into the adequacy of its insurance coverage for 
the project, but did not. 
4. The Court concludes that plaintiff's failure to 
promptly provide evidence of adequate liability insurance was a 
material breach of the contract. 
5. The Court concludes that defendants were justified 
in terminating plaintiff's services for plaintiff's breach of its 
obligation to promptly provide evidence of adequate liability 
insurance. 
6. The Court concludes that defendants were justified 
in terminating plaintiff's services because plaintiff spent very 
few hours on the job site and did not give the construction 
project the attention that it required under the contract and 
that plaintiff knew Mr. Kurzet would expect. 
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7. The Court concludes that defendants are not in 
breach of the contract in any way, 
8. With respect to plaintiff's Unjust Enrichment 
Claim, the Court has considered several alternative methods of 
calculating any award to plaintiff under such a theory. The 
Court concludes the most logical basis to be the percentage of 
defendants' residence that was completed during the period plain-
tiff was on the job. 
9. The Court rejects plaintiff's proposal that it 
should receive 1/4 or $25,000, of the $100,000 consideration con-
templated under the contract because it spent three months on the 
job, or one quarter, of the one-year period for constructing the 
residence as contemplated under the contract. The Court finds 
that such a proposal is unreasonable and unsupported by the 
facts. 
10. The Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to 
receive $15,500 from defendant in quantum meruit/unjust enrich-
ment, based on the contract between plaintiff and defendants, 
$10,000 representing 1/10 of the contract price of $100,000 for 
services in completing 1/10 of the construction, and $5,500 for 
services involving negotiations for the purchase of lumber. 
11. The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to 
defendant for the sum of $1,800 which represents defendants' 
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costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants' 
east side retaining wall. 
12* The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to 
defendants in the amount of $2,000 which represents defendants' 
costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of defendants' 
west side concrete steps. 
13. The Court concludes that plaintiff is liable to 
defendants in the amount of $559, which represents defendants' 
costs for plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary Glu-Lam beams. 
14. The Court concludes plaintiff is entitled to 
pre-judgment interest at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum, 
from November 1, 1990, the date defendants terminated plaintiff's 
services, to April 17, 1992, the date this Court granted plain-
tiffs' Motion to Compel Filing of Findings of Fact, and 
post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum from and after April 17, 1992. 
DATED this ^ day of C&% » , 1992, 
BY THE COURT: 
OVED AS TO FORM: 
^?^z^^%t< 
HOMER WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
li \Ss^ 
: C : 
IUCE J. NELSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff *»*l. _»IV»* ***MlWllli»»»' 
WJE/052092A 
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ADDENDUM B 
SPENCER E. AUSTIN (0150) 
WILLIAM J. EVANS (5276) 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
' i i L E O 
Clerk o* Summit County 
BY
 Deputy & A 
A& 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
BAILEY-ALLEN COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
STANLEY M. KURZET, an 
individual; STANLEY M. KURZET 
and ANNE L. KURZET, as Trustees 
for THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; 
THE KURZET FAMILY TRUST; and 
John Does 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 10870 
* * * * * * * * 
This action came on for trial before the Court, the 
Honorable Homer Wilkinson, District Judge, presiding, and the 
issues, having been duly tried to the Court, and the Court having 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That plaintiff recover from defendants in quantum 
meruit/unjust enrichment, based on the contract between plaintiff 
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and defendants, the amount of $11,141.00, with interest thereon 
at the legal rate provided by law in accordance with paragraph 4 
below, which represents $10,000 for services rendered in direct-
ing and supervising l/10th of the construction of defendants1 
residence, and $5,500 for plaintiff's services involving negotia-
tions for the purchase of lumber, adjusted by applying as an off-
set the following awards to defendants: 
a. The sum of $1,800 which represents defen-
dants' costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of 
defendants' east side retaining wall; 
b. The sum of $2,000 which represents defen-
dants' costs in repairing plaintiff's faulty construction of 
defendants' west side concrete steps; and 
c. The sum of $559 which represents defendants' 
costs caused by plaintiff's ordering three unnecessary materials; 
2. That defendants are not entitled to attorneys' 
fees and costs attributable to defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment; 
3. That plaintiff is awarded $542.40 as its costs of 
court itemized as follows : 
a. Filing fee, $75,00; 
b. Service of process fees, $32.25; 
c. Kurzet deposition; $311.15; 
-2-
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d. Bailey/Kent depositions, $99*00; and 
e. Expert witness fee, $25.00. 
4. That plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment inter-
est on $11,141.00 at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum for 
the period from November 1, 1990 to April 17, 1992, and 
post-judgment interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per 
annum from and after April 17, 1992; and 
5. That defendant's counterclaims are hereby dis-
missed with prejudice. 
day of . 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED t h i s 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
iRUCE J . NELSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
/—f^h^^ ~ ^ * t t g j ^ , , 
HOMER WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
V* ', CC'UftTY .»! 
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A G R E E M E N T 
This Agreement covers all of the understandings existing 
between BAILEY-ALLEN (Contractor) and STANLEY KURZET (Owner) for 
the construction of a residence on LOT #4 of the EVERGREEN 
development at DEER VALLEY, PARK CITY, UTAH* 
The Contractor is retained by Owner on a cost plus fixed fee 
basis. Costs shall be billed monthly and payment shall be made 
within ten days of receipt of billing. The fee fixed for this 
contract is set at $100,000 for the residence as depicted in the 
drawings plus a maximum of $50,000 in directed additional work, if 
any. Any directed additional work in excess of an aggregate cost 
of $50,000 will result in additional fees based on 7% of the cost 
of such additional work. 
All billing incorporating costs involving subcontractors or 
suppliers will be supported by copies of invoices clearly showing 
that the services were performed and/or materials delivered at the 
job site and shall further carry the notation by Contractor that 
the billing is true and correct. 
In the event that Owner's absence from Park City would result 
in failing to pay Contractor in a timely manner as set forth above. 
Contractor may Fax the billing to Owner and Owner shall cause 
payment to by made by express mail or electronic transfer directly 
to Contractor's account, however, when such payment is made, Owner 
reserves the right to review and obtain adjustment if indicated 
pending the opportunity to review the records and work performed 
upon Owner's return. 
Both Contractor and Owner stipulate that this contract cannot 
be changed except and unless in writing, bearing the date and 
signatures of both parties. 
The residence shall be constructed in accordance with the 
drawings and no change will be made without the express written 
consent of Owner. All changes will be covered by a written Change 
Order in the form of EXHIBIT A attached hereto, describing the 
nature of the change, the resulting differential in costs and the 
impact on completion schedule if any and be dated and approved by 
both Owner and Contractor. 
The work is to be performed in accordance with a schedule 
prepared by Contractor and the structure completed by April 15, 
1991 and a Temporary Certificate of Occupancy shall have been 
obtained by that date. The only Item permissible to be outstanding 
on the TCO is landscaping. A schedule in the general form of 
Exhibit B, prepared by Contractor shall be the definitive document 
for assessing whether work is or is not progressing on schedule. 
The residence was designed through the cooperative effort of 
1 
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Mark Walker, the Architect and Owner. Any questions pertaining to 
the structure should be directed to Mark Walker or his associate, 
Stan Johnson. If the architect fails to respond and such continued 
failure will cause increased construction costs, Owner is to be 
notified at the earliest possible moment so that he has the 
opportunity to mitigate such costs. The Owner shall not be liable 
for increased costs occasioned by such delays in response or 
recovery from drawing or design errors where the Contractor failed 
to notify Owner before the increased costs were so incurred. 
The Owner will have review authority and right of refusal on 
subcontracts and material purchases. The Contractor will obtain 
competitive bids for services and materials in sufficient time to 
permit a review of a maximum of one week duration by Owner and if 
necessary, select an alternative supplier without impact on 
schedule or cost. Every effort will be made by the Contractor to 
locate, solicit and select suppliers sufficiently in advance of 
need to prevent the forced acceptance of an uneconomic bid because 
a delay would be as costly or more costly than the loss arising 
from the uneconomic bid. All bids will provide sufficient detail 
to permit an intelligent analysis of the value of such bid. Time 
and material bids will at minimum state the proposed hourly rates 
for each category of labor and the percentage of fees and all other 
costs to be passed on to Owner for labor and material. Both fixed 
price and T&M bids will adequately identify the materials to be 
provided as to quantity, type, grade, model and manufacturer as 
applicable. 
The Owner's review authority notwithstanding, the Contractor 
is fully responsible to Owner for the performance of 
subcontractors. Accordingly, costs occasioned by the failure of a 
subcontractor to perform shall not be assessable to Owner. 
The Contractor shall carry insurance specifically providing for 
saving Owner harmless from any action arising due to the injury of 
a worker even if an employ of a subcontractor or supplier who is 
not properly or adequately insured. Contractor shall, within 10 
days of the date of this agreement furnish a Certificate of 
Insurance prepared by the Carrier or its Authorized Agent. The 
Certificate shall specifically state the purpose and limits of the 
policy and these shall show that the work to be performed under 
this contract is covered. 
Owner specifically states and Contractor acknowledges that 
Owner and only Owner is empowered to direct the Contractor to incur 
cost unforeseen by the plans and specifications that are in excess 
of an aggregate of $1,000 (one thousand Dollars) for any given 
category. A category is defined as a class of event such as work 
performed in accordance with a plan error that must be corrected, 
or need to perform additional work as a result of inclement 
weather, or rework directed by the City Inspector and similarly 
reasonably unforseeable events. Accordingly, any costs arising 
from the performance of a directive from any person whomsoever 
oaotfio 
other than Owner which are in excess of the $1,000 aggregate per 
category limit, will not be reimbursable under this agreement. 
Therefore, in order for cost arising from any ordered changes or 
rework to be reimbursable to Contractor, such work must be 
described and authorized in writing. However, the Owner will not 
unreasonably withhold approval for any proposed additional work 
which may in the opinion of Architect, Contractor, Inspector, 
Engineer, members of Owner's family or others be deemed necessary 
or desirable. 
The Contractor warrants that the residence will be free of of 
defects in workmanship and materials and shall, at no expense to 
Owner, correct any such defect for a period of one year from the 
date of the Temporary Certificate of Occupancy. The Contractor's 
liability in this regard specifically extends to consequential 
damage as may occur as a direct result of such deficiency in 
workmanship, and material. The Contractor's warranty liability 
does not extend to work performed or materials provided by Owner or 
to any consequence arrising therefrom. 
Contractor takes note that Owner is concerned about the 
quality of workmanship and materials and that this concern stems 
from prior experience with a local contractor and ownership of 
several condominiums at the Pinnacle development. Owner will not 
make unreasonable demands, however, slovenly workmanship and/or 
substandard materials will neither be accepted or paid for by 
Owner. Owner considers that the fees he pays to Contractor are 
specifically for his expertise in selecting and supervising workers 
so as to avoid unacceptable and substandard workmanship and/or the 
use of substandard quality materials. 
Both Owner and Contractor stipulate that time is of the 
essence and both will make every effort to reach the other as 
expeditiously as possible. The Owner and Contractor can be 
contacted as set forth in Exhibit C. 
In the event Owner will not be at either of these locations, 
Owner will leave or fax a schedule indicating where he can be 
reached on any given day. 
In the event Contractor is not available, he shall leave word 
as to who is authorized to act for Contractor. 
Entered into this Third Day Of July, 1990 at Park City, Utah. 
CONTRACTOR *' ' v l~ OWNER 
3 
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EXHIBIT A 
C H A N G E O R D E R 
In connection with the construction of the Kurzet residence on Lot 
#4 Evergreen, Mountainland Builders is hereby authorized to perform 
the following specific work and to supply the materials and 
services as needed for such performance. 
WORK DESCRIPTION 
UNDERSTANDINGS 
The cost differential of the above described work shall be: 
The affect on schedule of the described work shall be: 
APPROVALS 
CONTRACTOR DATE OWNER DATE 
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EXHIBIT C 
TO CONTACT CONTRACTOR 
Office: P.O. Box 11074 
Salt Lake City, UT 
84147 
Richard Allen Tel. 801-973-7888 
Michael Kent 
Park City Mobil 
Salt Lake Mobil 
Work Site 
Jeremy Ranch 
801-466-4169 
645-8450..1118 
534-0429.. 115.8 
TBD 
645-8449 
TO CONTACT OWNER 
Park City: 
Oregon Ranch: 
Tel. 645-9269 
Fax 645-8622 
Mobile 801-573-4453 
PO Box 680670 
1250 Pinnacle Drive 
Park City, UT 68048 
Tel. 503-888-9269 
Fax 503-888-6055 
PO Box 5039 
Charleston Station 
Charleston, OR 97420 
Tahiti 
Direct dial 
from USA 
Aircraft: 
Mobile: 
Box Postal 21164 
Papeete 
French Polynesia 
011-689-532-235 
Direct Dial 402-931-1124 
801-573-4453 
000014 
ADDENDUM D 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 14-2-2(3) (1993), Contractors' Bonds, Private 
Contracts: 
Failure of owner to obtain payment bond — 
Liability. 
(3) In an action for failure to obtain a 
bond, the court may award reasonable 
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party. 
These fees shall be taxed as costs in the 
action. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1993), Mechanics' Liens: 
Attorneys' fees. 
In any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party shall 
be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' 
fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be 
taxed as costs in the action. 
3. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(e) (1993): 
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the 
judgment. The clerk must include in any 
judgment signed by him any interest on the 
verdict or decision from the time it was 
rendered, and the costs, if the same have been 
taxed or ascertained. The clerk must, within 
two days after the costs have been taxed or 
ascertained, in any case where not included in 
the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a 
blank left in the judgment for that purpose, 
and make a similar notation thereof in the 
register of actions and in the judgment 
docket. 
4. Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-504(1) (1993): 
Written orders, judgments and decrees. 
(1) In all rulings by a court, counsel for 
the party or parties obtaining the ruling 
shall within fifteen days, or within a shorter 
time as the court may direct, file with the 
court a proposed order, judgment, or decree in 
conformity with the ruling. 
